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LAWYERS, LAW, AND CONTRACT
FORMATION
Comments on Daniel Keating's
'Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action'
Robert K. Rasmussen*
Attempting to infuse the austerity of theory with a dose of reality,
an intrepid group of legal scholars has left the security of the office
and ventured into the work-a-day world of commercial practices. The
information that they have gathered and are sharing with the rest of us
is furthering our understanding of the interaction between commercial
law and commercial practice. Embedded in much of the research they
have generated is the not-so-flattering conclusion that law professors
suffer from a self-serving bias. Those of us in the academy engage in
the assumption, often unstated or even unacknowledged, that the law
significantly affects the behavior of parties to a contract. This belief in
the force of law applies to all aspects of the contracting process: con
tract formation, contract interpretation, and the remedies available af
ter a contract has been breached. This assumption of the importance
of law enhances the status of commercial law professors in that it
makes what we teach, and by implication us, important.
The easy link between statutes and cases - law on the books and actual contracting practice - law in action - has been strained
severely, if not shattered, by the various studies that have been pro
duced so far, both in this Symposium and elsewhere. The stated goal
of the recent empirical research in commercial law is to provide a
richer understanding of the forces that shape transactions between
private parties, with this understanding often being that law is less im
portant than we may have thought before. While various researchers
are using differing methodologies to examine commercial practice,
one especially fruitful course of inquiry is to talk to the participants in
the actual transactions. As an illustration, consider Professor Dan
Keating's excellent contribution to this Symposium.1
Professor
Keating explores the role that standardized forms play in contracting
behavior by talking to both buyers and sellers of goods. This method-

* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. B.A. 1982, Loyola (Chicago); J.D. 1985,
University of Chicago. - Ed. I would like to thank John Goldberg and Alan Schwartz for
helpful comments on an earlier version of these comments.
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ology traces back at least to Stewart Macaulay's famous study of busi
ness practices in Wisconsin.2 The picture drawn by these "law in ac
tion" pieces enriches our understanding of commercial law, with the
conclusion inevitably being that one cannot ascertain the way in which
private parties contract between themselves by simply reading the ap
plicable state-supplied legal rules. One has to talk to the players in
volved.
As Karl Llewellyn urged long ago, studies such as these serve as an
important corrective to the natural academic tendency toward solip
sism. We cannot simply assume that the statutes and cases that we
teach provide a direct view into contracting behavior. In this caution
ary tale for law teachers, there may also be a cautionary tale for em
pirical legal research. For there is no reason to believe that law pro
fessors have a monopoly on self-serving biases. Probably most of us
have a need to view ourselves ill a positive, if in fact unrealistic, way.3
This tendency suggests that we should be careful about extrapolating
from research that relies on interviews with commercial parties about
their perceptions of commercial practice.4 In particular, we might
worry that the information received reflects the natural bias toward
self-importance among those people to whom the researchers have
spoken.5 Recognizing the existence of the bias need not lessen the
value of this research. Rather, a skeptical treatment of the information received can actually enhance its value.
There are at least three ways in which the self-importance bias may
affect the lessons that should be drawn from this body of work. The
first is that bias will affect the importance that commercial actors will
attach to law. Based on the general tendency of everyone to inflate
their own importance, nonlawyers would be less likely to acknowledge
the law as an important part of their calculus, whereas lawyers would
be more likely to do so. It is not that either nonlawyers or lawyers
have a preferred perspective on the "true" state of affairs; rather, it is
that law is the province of lawyers, and thus, lawyers will be more
likely to perceive an important role for law in any given transaction

2 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business:
28 AM Soc. REV. 55, 55 (1963).

A Preliminary Study,

.

3. See Albert Bandura, Human Agency in Social Cognitive Theory, 44 AM
PSYCHOLOGIST 1175, 1175-79 (1989); Jeff Greenberg et al., Why Do People Need Self
Esteem? Converging Evidence That Self-Esteem Serves an Anxiety-Buffering Function, 63 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 913, 920 (1992).
.

4. Not all of the recent empirical research in co=ercial law has relied on such inter
views. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2494 (2000) (relying on banking documents); Robert K. Rasmussen & Ran
dall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 1357 (2000) (relying on bankruptcy court filings).
5. See Donald C. Langevoort, Ego,
854-60 (1995).
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than would nonlawyers. Nonlawyers, on the other hand, presumably
would emphasize those attributes of the transaction for which they
have a comparative advantage.
There is a second way that the recognition of a self-serving bias on
the part of those interviewed can add to what we learn from those in
terviews. The differing perceptions of lawyers and nonlawyers pro
vides a glimpse into the workings of the firm. A standard criticism of
economics - which can be extended to much of the empirical work on
commercial law as well - is that it too often ignores how decisions are
made inside a firm. A firm is treated as a "black box" that makes the
value-maximizing decision. But information gathered from the field
suggests that law can be a way for lawyers inside a firm to, at the mar
gin, increase their status within the firm. In-house counsel can ad
vance their position by emphasizing the importance of law, whereas
others in the firm may find it in their interest to downplay law's sig
nificance. To the extent that this is true, decisions by firms may not
represent the optimal weighing of costs and benefits sometimes im
plied in the literature, but rather reflect the outcome of an internal
struggle for power and prestige.
Finally, the likely presence of bias in descriptions of how commer
cial actors work complicates the normative stance we should take to
ward participants' views of proposed changes in the law. The promise
of seeking the wisdom of those in the field is that they can provide in
valuable "situation sense" in assessing the likely impact of proposed
reform.6 The possibility of bias, however, makes it difficult to credit
these observations uncritically. Indeed, the extent to which law re
form efforts should take account of bias is a difficult question. On the
one hand, bias may call into question the accuracy of some statements
about the efficacy of a proposed change. On the other, it may lead to
a resistance to embrace change, which would be a true cost in at
tempting to move toward a better legal regime.
Professor Keating's work on the battle of the forms provides an
excellent vehicle for exploring these issues. His article is itself a wor
thy addition to the growing empirical research on commercial law; it
tackles one of the staples of the law school curriculum, section 2-207 of
the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). At the same time, it pro
vides concrete examples of how the bias of those interviewed may af
fect the vision of "law in action" that one receives. Whereas the re
searchers in other studies have spoken either primarily or exclusively
with nonlawyers, Professor Keating deals primarily with lawyers. Pro
fessor Keating examines the contracting behavior of twenty-five firms.

6. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmoN: DECIDING APPEALS
268-85 (1960). For an excellent discussion of "situation sense" and its relation to practical
reasoning, see Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism,
and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992).
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For nineteen of these firms, the information comes from lawyers.7
This predominance of lawyers in the data set, as compared with the
lack of lawyers in other reports, provides an opportunity to examine
how the respective biases of lawyers and nonlawyers may affect con
clusions about the impact of law in the work-a-day world.
One can readily understand why Professor Keating selected sec
tion 2-207 as the basis for his empirical study. Section 2-207's legen
dary opacity makes it an ideal doctrinal "nut" to crack: a contracts
professor's dream, and a nightmare for students.
On first reading, one may be tempted to view Professor Keating's
findings as consistent with other empirical work questioning the effect
of legal rules in the real world. Indeed, Professor Keating's empirical
research has shown that commercial practice has fared much better at
surviving the thicket of section 2-207 than has the average law student.
Many firms, Professor Keating reports, avoid engaging in a battle of
the forms in the first instance, and those that do rarely become in
volved in disputes.8 Moreover, such disputes that arise are, by and
large, settled amicably. From this description it would be a short step
to conclude that section 2-207 may serve the purposes of pedagogy,
while it does not affect actual commercial practice.
While Professor Keating's research calls into question the number
of times that section 2-207 may have to be invoked in order to flesh
out a contract, there is a way in which his findings suggest a larger role
for law than do other studies. By way of contrast, consider the article
by Professor Lisa Bernstein presented at this symposium.9 In her
study of the cotton industry, Professor Bernstein finds law to be a dis
tant, barely visible force. Not only has the cotton industry created a
private legal system apart from the U.C.C., but the buyers and sellers
in the cotton industry do not even act much in the shadow of this pri
vate legal system. Professor Bernstein's examinations of other indus
tries have reached similar conclusions.10 Yet for those to whom Pro
fessor Keating spoke, the law seems more immediate. For example,
the decision of many sellers to enter into what Professor Keating
terms a "fully dickered" contract is a decision that acknowledges the
existence of law. It represents a decision to spend the time necessary
to reach assent as to how certain future contingencies will be handled

7. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2693.
8. Professor Macaulay reached similar conclusions. See Macualay, supra note 2, at 59-60
(of 16 sales managers interviewed, 7 reported that they did not engage in a battle of the
forms).
9. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2001).
10. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opt
ing Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
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as opposed to relying on the terms that the law would apply were
there to be divergent forms. Professor Keating reports that sellers of
ten worried about being stuck with the U.C.C.'s default rule on conse
quential damages. Those who represented buyers, in contrast, were
willing to rest on forms because of their comfort with the gap fillers
provided by the U.C.C. Needless to say, these are determinations
driven by the extant legal rules. Indeed, none of those interviewed
seems to have expressed ignorance about section 2-207 or to have
failed to think about the battle of the forms question.
It is of course possible that the attention paid to the law by Profes
sor Keating's sources, as opposed to the lack of attention paid to the
law by the sources in other studies, may be due to the fact that the
sources worked in different industries in each study. It may be that
contracting behavior in some industries is shaped by legal rules, while
in others it is governed by nonlegal norms. There very well could be a
heterogeneity of approaches to contract formation. Admittedly, there
is no firm basis in the current empirical work for rejecting this hy
pothesis. There is no evidence that Professor Keating's subjects
worked in the same industries as those studied by other researchers.
Yet I want to suggest another possible explanation. The fact that Pro
fessor Keating spoke primarily to lawyers may have magnified the im
portance of law in the answers that he received.
The defining characteristic of lawyers is that they are experts in the
law. Legal training provides lawyers with a set of skills and norms that
supports a distinct professional identity. People in general tend to
perceive the world in ways that increase their own status and impor
tance.11 For lawyers, this tendency could cause them to attach height
ened importance to the law. The more that the law can affect a given
transaction, the more that the lawyer is needed to ensure that the
transaction proceeds without a hitch. Professor Keating's study, which
is replete with references to law, arguably provides evidence to this ef
fect.
The lessons for interpreting the data obtained by empirical re
searchers are twofold. First, we may be entitled to assume that studies
relying predominately on the reporting of nonlawyers systematically
understates the effect that law has on transactional behavior. Non
lawyers know that law is not their domain. To the extent that they
perceive law as affecting their transaction, they are in effect acknowl
edging that they are not in complete control of the situation. They are
ceding power to others. Such an admission would tend to threaten
their egos and thus may be suppressed. This implies that we should
hesitate before we fully credit studies, based on reports from the field,
which find that law has little to no effect on real world behavior. Sec11. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role
of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 375, 428-30 (1997).
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ond, it may be that interviews with lawyers result in overstating the
importance of law.
Perhaps the most notable example of this difference in perspective
in Professor Keating's piece occurs when he explains why he ended up
speaking primarily with lawyers. He notes that, in conducting his in
terviews, "the most useful interviews seemed to be with in-house
counsel ...," while "[b]usiness people� .. often lack the richness ...
of the in-house counse1.m2 I take the "richness" to which Professor
Keating refers as being that lawyers have a more detailed explanation
of how they handle the problems raised by section 2-207, the subject of
his study. The lawyers,apparently,have thought about this problem a
lot,whereas the nonlawyers have not.
One can find a similar difference in perception between lawyers
and nonlawyers in Professor Macaulay's article. He reported that
"lawyers ... said businessmen often commit their firms to significant
exchanges too casually....".13 In the same vein, Professor Macaulay
found "that businessman are least concerned about planning their
transactions so that they are legally enforceable contracts."14 In short,
lawyers focus on the legal aspects of transactions; businessmen do not.
This difference in focus raises important and underresearched
questions about how these differences are resolved inside firms. Most
large firms contain both nonlawyers and lawyers. After all,while Pro
fessor Keating and other individuals speak with individuals, ulti
mately, it is the firm that becomes a party to the contract. Professor
Keating's work sheds light on how decisions in a firm may be reached.
Rightly understood, Professor Keating and those to whom he
spoke discuss the general question of contract negotiation. Specifi
cally,they address the decision as to the level of resources that should
be invested in contract negotiations. Each party to a potential transac
tion has to decide what level of resources to spend on negotiating the
contract. An ideal contract - what the economists call a fully contin
gent contract - specifies the rights each party would have against the
other under all possible future contingencies. Given the limits of hu
man foresight,such contracts do not exist. Rather,contracts are often
incomplete.15
A somewhat more attainable goal is what Professor Keating calls a
"fully dickered " contract. In this contract, both parties knowingly as
sent to all of its terms. There may be terms that have been uninten
tionally left out. Moreover,the terms that are actually in the contract

12. Keating, supra note 1, at 2693.
13. Macaulay, supra note 2, at 60.
14. Id.
15. On the reasons for incomplete contracts and possible approaches to dealing with
such contracts, see Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 277 (1998).
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may not be optimal in that they may not specify the efficient rule in all
situations. The defining feature of this contract, however, is that there
is no doubt that each party knowingly has consented to the terms that
appear in the writings that constitute the contract. Any incomplete
ness in the contract is due to lack of foresight rather than strategic
concerns. When a dispute arises, the parties themselves may try to re
solve their dispute in light of the terms to which they agreed. Cer
tainly, if the matter rose to the level of litigation, a court would look to
these agreed-to terms for guidance in reaching a decision.
At the other extreme of detail, one can imagine contracts in which
the firms only agree to the basic terms of the deal - price, quantity,
and delivery. A simple phone call or a trip to the seller may lead to a
contract where the parties agree to the bare essentials, and neither
makes any effort to provide the nonimmediate terms of the contract.
In most cases, the bare essentials complete the transaction, and there
is no subsequent dispute. For those cases in which a dispute arises,
courts have to supply a "gap filler" to resolve the dispute. In the case
of a sale of goods, this gap filler comes from the relevant state's en
actment of the U.C.C.
Somewhere between these two extremes of contractual incom
pleteness lies the battle of the forms. Each firm puts resources into
drafting or selecting a form to use. It then employs internal mecha
nisms to ensure that the firm's employees use the form when buying or
selling goods. The firm, in this situation, thus spends more resources
than when there simply is an agreement on the major terms. The firm,
however, does not go to the extreme of trying to reach an agreement
on the nonimmediate terms covered by the form. When a dispute
arises in cases falling into this intermediate zone, section 2-207 directs
a court to the rule of decision.
Were one to assume that firms are rational, money-maximizing en
tities, one easily could construct a story by which the firm always
spends the efficient amount of resources on any given contract. Each
firm has to choose the level of resources to invest in contractual nego
tiations. Perhaps the most interesting finding of Professor Keating in
this regard is the extent to which firms choose not to engage in battles
of the forms. By my count, at least ten of the twenty-five firms that
Professor Keating investigates have decided to avoid a battle of the
forms by insisting on a fully dickered contract.16 The primary reason
for this decision seems to be economies of scale. The one unifying fac
tor among these firms is that their transactions involve repeat dealings
with other firms
.

16. Professor Macaulay reports similar findings. See Macaulay, supra note 2, at 59·60
(of 16 sales managers questioned, 7 stated that they did not engage in transactions which re
sulted in the exchange of competing forms).
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One can readily explain why repeated dealings may lead to more
complete contracts. When two parties are going to engage in basically
the same transaction over and over, the cost of agreeing on the non
immediate terms is fixed. The nonimmediate terms to which the par
ties would agree do not vary based on any individual transaction. The
value-maximizing provision on consequential damages or warranties is
the same in the first transaction as in the hundredth transaction. The
parties merely have to agree on that term. The cost of reaching such
an agreement does not turn on the number of transactions between
the two parties. Put simply, the cost of agreement on nonimmediate
terms is a fixed cost.
The cost of not agreeing on nonimmediate terms, however, turns
on a variety of factors: the number of transactions that the parties will
engage in, the amount at stake in any subsequent dispute, and the
likelihood that such a dispute will arise. Each transaction for which
the parties do not take the time to reach an agreement on the nonim
mediate terms carries with it a risk that a dispute will arise later that
will be resolved by something other than the parties' agreement. As
the number of transactions increases, the cost of nonagreement in
creases. Thus, the cost of not agreeing on nonimmediate terms in this
setting is a variable cost.
At some point, this variable cost of failing to specify nonimmediate
terms will exceed the cost of creating a fully dickered agreement, and
the parties will find it in their interest to agree on the nonimmediate
terms. Professor Keating's description of the evolution of contractual
practices demonstrates that, as one lowers the cost of contracting, par
ties are more likely to contract for the terms that they determine are in
their joint interest.17 For those firms that have not completely opted
out of the battle of the forms, those in charge of contracting use their
"situation sense" to identify those transactions where the gains pro
vided by a fully dickered contract exceed the cost of obtaining one.18
All is well and good.
The story becomes more complicated, and less Panglosian, when
we look at how a firm may make a contracting decision. At least in
the cases where lawyers have input into the decisionmaking process, it
may well be that firms are too quick to engage in detailed negotia
tions. Inside a firm, there is a basic struggle among various actors for
influence and prestige. This struggle can come from a number of

17. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2713-14 (predicting as retailers become larger, they will
be more likely to opt for a fully dickered contract).
18.

See id. at 2698:

[C]ompanies tended to take an ad hoc approach that considered various factors that would
weigh in favor of doing a truly integrated contract: the overall size of the deal, the likelihood
that a particular buyer-seller relationship would end up being long-term, the reputation of
the company on the other side, and any risk that was perceived to be unusual.
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sources. Perhaps it is each individual actor's need to portray herself as
essential to the mission of the firm. Perhaps it is simply that the
higher-up actors have a budget constraint in terms of the time that
they can devote to the firm, and it thus behooves those below to com
pete against each other for attention. Regardless of the animating
cause, each actor has to make a claim that she provides an essential
service.
This give and take over importance is not confined to the higher
reaches of a firm's management. Every person in a firm, regardless of
where she is on the firm's hierarchy, has an incentive to overstate her
importance. The battle of the forms problem illustrates this point.
The question of choosing between a battl� of the forms and a fully
dickered contract is unlikely to occupy the attention of a firm's Board
of Directors or even highly placed members of the management team.
The general point is that, regardless of where inside the firm the deci
sion is made, lawyers will have a tendency to highlight legal risks, and
nonlawyers will have a tendency to downplay such risks.
In this battle for importance within the firm, the optimal strategy
for in-house counsel is clear. The more legal problems that arise and
that they can solve, the more their status increases. Indeed, it has
been suggested that corporate counsel often have an incentive to over
state legal risk as a way to enhance their prestige inside the firm.19 Of
course, in-house counsel cannot overplay their hand. Legal risks can
not be too great, or too unmanageable; otherwise, outside counsel may
be called in. In-house counsel, thus, have to acknowledge both the
importance of law - so as to tout their superiority over mere business
people - and the importance of the actual business - so as to main
tain a comparative advantage over outside counsel. In the case of the
battle of the forms, this strategy could take the form of deciding too
early that detailed negotiations are necessary. Detailed negotiations
that focus on nonimmediate terms are the province of lawyers. Non
lawyers are quite adept at negotiating over price, quantity, and date of
delivery. Lawyers, however, have a comparative advantage in wran
gling over terms such as warranty and consequential damages. The
more important these nonimmediate terms loom in a transaction, the
more important the lawyer's input becomes.
To be sure, the nonlawyers in the firm have a countervailing incen
tive not to credit the importance of legal terms. Whereas lawyers find
it in their interest to overstate the importance of law, nonlawyers
would benefit by understating it.20 At the level of theory, one cannot

19, See Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 415-16,
20. A similar situation seems to occur in relations to Electronic Data Interchange
agreements. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2713-14 ("[M]ost companies do not also use [the
negotiation of an EDI agreement] to work out the general terms and conditions of the sale
beyond the issues surrounding the electronic mode of communication.").
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say with confidence that these effects tend to balance each other out,
or that one is stronger than the other. Indeed, the answer may vary
from firm to firm.
The one piece of evidence that suggests that firms may overinvest
in contractual negotiations is the paucity of litigation after disputes
arise. Both Professor Keating and Professor Macaulay found that con
tract litigation over the battle of the forms is not a frequent occur
rence.21 Both report that disputes generally are worked out without
resort to legal process. The salient difference between expenditures
on contract negotiation and those on litigation is that, after the fact, it
is easier to measure whether the expenditures were cost-justified in
the litigation setting. After litigation, a manager overseeing in-house
counsel can readily compare litigation's costs with its returns. Such an
easy analysis is not available for funds spent on contractual negotia
tions. There is always a plausible claim that the expenditures pre
vented future problems. Thus, it may be easier for lawyers inside a
firm to make excessive expenditures on contractual negotiations than
on contractual litigation.
In sum, once we take into account self-importance bias, the happy
story that firms make optimal decisions regarding when to engage in a
battle of forms and when to contract out of such a fight may not be
true. The decision as to the amount of resources to spend on the
nonimmediate terms to a contract may represent, instead, the outcome
of a battle between lawyers and nonlawyers inside the firm for a con
tract. This observation is meant neither as a criticism of those who fo
cus on lawyers or those who do not. Rather, it is simply one of cau
tion. Firms, no less than the people who comprise them, are complex.
In looking for the effect of law, we should remember that we do not
receive unbiased statements from the front. Rather, we get perception
filtered through life experiences.
Typically, the empirical literature on commercial law tends to offer
two possible justifications for contracts: they increase efficiency or
they enable monopoly.22 In either situation, the firm is acting ration
ally. It is entering into a contract that provides value to the firm.
Looking inside the firm, however, suggests a third reason for the level
of contractual completeness: it is a victory by the attorneys for status.

21. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2696; Macaulay, supra note 2, at 61-62. While Profes·
sor Keating notes that there is little litigation over section 2·207, Macaulay notes that there is
little contract litigation as a general matter. The one thing that we do not know is, in those
situations in which litigation over a contract occurs, how often does it involve section 2·207
as opposed to some other basis for dispute.
22. See, e.g., John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunc·
t/onal Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2423 (2000).
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The more legal issues that have to be negotiated and resolved, the
more important the lawyers become.23
Perhaps one of the more novel aspects of Professor Keating's study
is that he not only inquires into current contracting practices, but he
also asks his subjects about their reactions to potential changes in the
governing rules. He finds that those he asks, while intrigued by the
proposals offered by academics, generally do not favor their enact
ment. They are comfortable with the status quo, despite the wide
spread academic criticism of section 2-207.
The question becomes what normative stance should we take to
wards this information. Many academics have suggested changes in
the law, often radical changes. This is true in almost all areas of the
law, not just section 2-207. Indeed, I would imagine that one would be
hard pressed to find a single legal rule that some academic has not
taken issue with except, perhaps, the Thirteenth Amendment. In a
world full of proposals for change, what should be the role of profes
sional resistance to these changes?
On the one hand, it may be that those engaged in the daily practice
of commerce have a better perspective on reform than do legal com
mentators. Those on the ground can, drawing on their intuitions
honed over a number of years, provide insight as to whether a new
approach offers the prospect of beneficial change. They can anticipate
how commercial actors would or would not change their behavior
based on a change in the governing legal rule. They have what Karl
Llewellyn called "situation sense.'.z4 In the contract arena, they know
that, contrary to Professor Goldberg, having a court choose the better
form will insert the views of an outsider unschooled in the practical
needs of business. They also can discern, contrary to Professors Baird
and Weisberg, that having the last form govern will cause more prob
lems than exist under the current regime.
On the other hand, resistance to change may reflect other factors.
The lawyers with whom Professor Keating spoke may, like most peo
ple, have a bias towards the status quo.25 Literature from behavioral
economics suggests that parties are too wedded to the way things cur-

23. This notion of lawyers using law to improve their status in a firm gives one pause
before accepting entirely the description of lawyers as "transaction cost engineers." See gen
erally, Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,
94 YALE LJ. 239 {1984); Symposium: Business Lawyering and Value Creation for Clients, 74
OR. L. REV. 1 {1995).
24. LLEWELLYN, supra note 6.
25. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making,
1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H.
Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Win
ter 1991, at 193. One largely unexplored issue is the extent to which firm structure can
dampen the effect of this and other cognitive biases. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral
Economics, the Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Law and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1679, 1687-90 (1998).
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rently are. If this is the case, then those with whom Professor Keating
spoke may have underestimated the beneficial effect that a substantial
reform of section 2-207 could provide.
Somewhat more problematic, as suggested above, is that the
Byzantine provisions of section 2-207 may have inadvertently given
lawyers power in their relationships with others inside the firm In
deed, this power may explain the lawyers' resistance to proposals such
as the one offered by Professors Baird and Weisberg. These lawyers
stated that they like the uncertainty of current law. This taste for un
certainty may flow from the fact that uncertainty raises the status of
lawyers within the firm When a dispute over a transaction arises, the
nonlawyers have to turn to the lawyers for guidance.
Note that this explanation can also shed light on their response to
Professor Goldberg's proposal. Professor Goldberg's proposal ulti
mately allows the judge to pick the form that is more fair. This proce
dure would decrease the role of the lawyers. Indeed, the in-house
counsel to whom Professor Keating spoke objected to Professor
Goldberg's proposal precisely because it would put too much control
in the hands of a judge. Unstated is the corollary that it takes too
much power out of the lawyers' hands.
Yet, even if resistance to change is based on a desire to maintain
status (or the status quo) rather than on an accurate prediction of the
merits of a proposed reform, it may be the case that such resistance
still should counsel against the proposed change. Proponents of re
form too often implicitly assume compliant actors. The touted bene
fits materialize because those in the system readily adjust to the new
set of rules. A preference for the status quo may well impede the op
eration of the new regime. Passing a reform that will not be embraced
by those who must implement it may well be a cost of that change.
Bias may not be justified, but it is nevertheless real.
.

.

CONCLUSION
The current wave of empirical research undoubtedly enriches our
understanding of the relationship between legal rules and business de
cisions. Rather than rely on theoretical models of how people should
act, it provides us with data on how people do act. But once we substi
tute the reports of individuals for those of models, we have to be cog
nizant of the possibility that real people may not be as a candid as
models in stating how they reached their conclusions.
Well
constructed models specify their underlying assumptions and the rea
soning process that they use in each step of the analysis. Even the
more thoughtful of us may be unaware of the biased lens through
which we see the world.

